back [What follows is Addendum 5 to my book Looking for the Enemy]
5. My Beef With Chomsky
I wrote this in September 2000.
It can be taken as a summary of my correspondence with Noam Chomsky
(1989-1995), the detailed discussion of which follows in Addendum 6.
Chomsky
and AIDS
In
my first letter to Chomsky, in April 1989, I included my review of the Turner
film, The Men Who Killed Kennedy [see Addendum 7], which I had seen a
few months earlier and had so turned my head around. He replied (5/15/89) that
the review was "interesting" and that he "didn't know about the
events" I described.
In
retrospect, this is a puzzling remark. Three years later (3/3/92) he told me he
had "read a good bit of the critical literature" (meaning critical of
the Warren Report), so I suppose he did this reading in the meantime, the Gulf
War notwithstanding.
I
learned in 1995, however, after reading Ray Marcus's Appendix B (1995,
self-published), that Chomsky had been well informed about the evidence of
high-level conspiracy in the assassination twenty years before I wrote to him.
Marcus tells the story of trying to enlist the support of a number of
progressive intellectuals in reopening the JFK case in 1969:
I first met with Noam Chomsky. Soon after our discussions
began, he asked his secretary to cancel his remaining appointments for the day.
The scheduled one-hour meeting stretched to 3-4 hours. Chomsky showed great
interest in the material. We mutually agreed to a follow-up session later in
the week. Then I met with Gar Alperovitz [a professor at Harvard]. At the end
of our one-hour meeting, he said he would take an active part in the effort if
Chomsky would lead it...
[The second meeting] again lasted much of an afternoon.
The discussion ranged beyond evidentiary items to other aspects of the case. I
told Chomsky of Alperovitz' offer to assist him if he decided to lead an effort
to reopen. After the meeting, as they drove me back to my apartment, Bromberger
[another MIT professor who had attended the meeting] expressed the view that,
"If they are strong enough to kill the president, and strong enough to cover
it up, then they are too strong to confront directly...if they feel
sufficiently threatened., they may move to open totalitarian"
("they" was not further defined).
As we have seen from previous reactions by I.F. Stone,
A.L. Wirin, and Carey McWilliams, this was similar to the fears expressed or
implied by many leftist intellectuals among those who nevertheless professed
faith in the Warren Report. From Bromberger, I was hearing it for the first
time from someone who believed the report to be false.
I phoned Vince Salandria, of whom I had spoken to
Chomsky, and asked him to send Chomsky his research and thinking. Salandria
told me he was skeptical that Chomsky would actually get involved, based on his
previous experiences with such left-oriented people. He reasoned that had they
entertained any such intentions, they would have acted on them long before
this. Nevertheless, he agreed to send the material.
Upon
returning to Los Angeles, I wrote a lengthy letter to Chomsky summing up my
overview of the case to that time, and stating as cogently as I could the
arguments for his active involvement. He responded on April 18, 1969:
Just a
quick note. I got your long letter, and some material from Salandria. I'll read
both carefully. But I won't be able to decide anything until I return from
England, in mid-June. Right now things are simply too rushed, and I'm too
harassed to give serious thought to anything. I'll be in touch with you then. I
don't know what the odds are. I'm still open-minded (and I hope will remain so).
From
the context of our previous meetings it was clear that what Chomsky
"...won't be able to decide" until he returned from England was not
the question of whether or not there was a conspiracy–that he had given every
indication of having already decided in the affirmative–but whether or not he
wished to participate actively, even to assume a leading role, in the movement
to reopen the case.
I
never heard from him again, and Chomsky did not join such a movement. On the
contrary, in recent years he has on a number of occasions gone on record
attacking the critics' position and supporting the Warren Report (pp. 67-68).
What
"events" had I described in my little review that Chomsky
"didn't know about," after being informed by Marcus and Salandria twenty
years earlier?
There
is a telling parallel to this behavior in Chomsky's reaction to the AIDS origin
issue.
In
late summer 1989, I sent Chomsky an early (1986) paper by Segal in English and
a copy of his first book, Aids: Erreger aus dem Genlabor ("AIDS:
Virus from the Pentagon," Berlin: Simon und Leutner, 1987), which, though
in German, I thought he would be able to read. (After all, I had to pass a
German reading exam to qualify for my Ph.D. in linguistics, and he is the most
famous linguist in the world!) He
thanked me (8/26/89) for "the surprising and very interesting
material," without further comment.
I
had "surprised" him with the "very interesting" argument
that the Pentagon had created AIDS, and this was all he had to say? It was my
turn to be surprised. On Sept. 14, 1989 I sent him a copy of an article I had
written summarizing Segal's theory ("Is AIDS Man-Made?"). He thanked me (9/22/89) for the
"information," which he said was "most intriguing," but
again had no further comment.
On Nov. 29, 1989, I sent Chomsky a photocopy of the
MacArthur testimony from the Congressional Record (see "Informing the
Press" in Chapter 4). He
replied (12/28/89):
Thanks also for the
material from the Hearings. Sends a chill up the spine. This is very far from my
field, and I have no scientific judgment. But it is hard for me to believe that
one can't obtain a scientific judgment from some knowledgeable and unprejudiced
source. I don't know people directly involved in AIDS research, but there are
plenty of them around.
A year
later, on Nov. 30, 1990, I sent him another article about Segal, focussing on
the MacArthur testimony ("Burying
the Public Record"). Chomsky's reply (12/17/90) was: "Quite a
story." These were his last words on the subject to me. A "chill up the spine," but the
man who calls Washington the "terrorist capital of the world" has no
more to say on the subject.
The
parallel is clear. In 1969, he learns from Marcus and Salandria about the
evidence for conspiracy in the assassination, but has not a word more to say
about the subject until twenty years later, when I write to him, at which time
he professes "surprise" to hear about it. In 1989, he also expresses
surprise and horror at the idea that the "terrorist" US government may
have created AIDS, but has nothing further to say on this subject either. This
behavior strikes me as very much out of character–at least out of the character
that I thought, from reading his books, that Chomsky possessed.
There
is another significant parallel. Chomsky's trust in the integrity and
objectivity of the "scientific community" (in quotes because I think
it is more like the Mafia than a community) is astonishing, and again totally
out of character for a man who is considered by many to be the "leading
intellectual dissident" in the country. In 1989 he assures me that
"knowledgeable and unprejudiced" sources can answer the question of
the origin of AIDS (although he obviously does not wish to pursue the question,
despite a "chill up the spine"). A couple of years later, Chomsky
reveals his absolute faith in the National Academy of Sciences. In dismissing
the notion of conspiracy in the JFK assassination, he gives this example of
conspiracy logic (July 1, 1992):
Thus when the National
Academy of Sciences refutes by careful experiment the one reason offered by the
House Committee to question the Warren Report, we can simply conclude that the
scientists are in on the conspiracy. Anyone who knows them personally knows
that this is laughable...
It is
hard to remember, reading this, that the author is Noam Chomsky, author of many
books and articles excoriating other academics and journalists, not to mention
politicians and government officials, for their conformist, propagandized
mentality (e.g., Manufacturing Consent). But in these lines we learn not
only that it is "laughable" to doubt the judgment of a member of the
National Academy of Scientists, but also, implicitly, that the House Select
Committee on Assassinations 1979 report is trustworthy.
No one who has read "a good bit of the
literature" could maintain such faith in either of these institutions–even
before Gaeton Fonzi's definitive exposé of the HSCA's thoroughly compromised
"investigation" (The Last Investigation, NY: Thunder's Mouth
Press, 1993). No one, at least, who is not either incredibly naive, or the
worst example of the kind of propagandized intellectual that Chomsky has so
often (and effectively and correctly) warned us about.
Chomsky
and CAIB/CAQ
Chomsky
suggested that I send my review of the Turner film (The Men Who Killed Kennedy) to CovertAction Information
Bulletin (now Quarterly). This was the first I had heard of it. One
of CAIB's editors, Bill Vornberger, answered on 10/25/89 that they could not
print my review because they were planning to run a review of Jim Garrison's On
the Trail of the Assassins, which had just come out, in their next issue.
This review never appeared, and as far as I know CAIB/CAB has never published
anything about the Kennedy assassination.
Thus
the first obvious question: Why has a journal devoted to exposing the misdeeds
of the CIA so conspicuously avoided the subject of the JFK assassination, when
a large portion of the general public believes the CIA was involved, and
especially since the journal's longtime editors, Bill Schaap and Ellen Ray,
were also the editors at Sheridan Square Press, which published Garrison's
book, and the editors of Lies Of Our Times, a political monthly (now
defunct) that published favorable (and reasonable) reviews of the Stone film?
Chomsky
has always been a supporter of CAIB/CAQ; his photo adorns the magazine's
subscription inserts. "Quite a good rag," he told me (May 15, 1989).
"I write for it a lot." Here
again is a statement which in retrospect I find very puzzling. If I had
bothered to check, I would have found that Chomsky had published only two
articles in CAIB–actually only one, since the second one (No. 32, summer 1989)
was simply a shortened version of the first (No. 26, summer 1986), and they
were identically titled ("Libya in US Demonology").
Why
did Schaap and Ray publish virtually the same article twice within three years?
They had never done such a thing before, and they haven't since. Why would
Chomsky refer to this one article, published twice, as "a lot"? How
could he write for it "a lot," if it was only one article?
On
May 21, 1992, referring to Alexander Cockburn's review of the Stone film in The
Nation, Chomsky wrote to me:
But so far, his account
is the only one in print that does justice to the factual record. Perhaps I should
abstain from comment on this, since I did a lot of the background research for
it (though what he wrote is his way of using it).
I would
like to know how many professors, especially famous professors, do
"background research" for journalists. Chomsky is the only one I have
ever heard of. Maybe this is the way to understand his remark about having
written "a lot" for CAIB, although only one article had appeared
under his name. If he does "background research" for Alexander
Cockburn, why shouldn't he do it for others?
Although
CAIB/CAQ has strictly avoided the assassination in print, Vornberger told me in
the same letter that "we are very much aware of the fact that Kennedy was
killed by members of a conspiracy." "In fact," Vornberger
continued, "it is our opinion that these men were current or former
employees of the CIA." Vornberger
also said "we highly recommend" Jim Garrison's On the Trail of the
Assassins. The question screaming at us here is: If that's what they think,
why haven't they written about it?
CAIB/CAQ
and AIDS
I
also sent "Burying the Public
Record," which Chomsky found to be "quite a story," to Lies
Of Our Times. Bill Schaap replied (12/27/90) that they had "real
problems with the Segal material," that "the most credible critic in
this country of the standard medical establishment line is Dr. Peter
Duesberg," and that although "incredibly significant," the AIDS
origin issue was not, as I had called it, "'the biggest cover-up since
JFK.'"
He
said LOOT or CAIB would be interested in a "general piece on the failure
of the media (U.S. and Western Europe) to cover alternative theories in
general, which would not have to accept any particular theory, but would show
how conferences which take the establishment line get considerable coverage
whereas those which do not are barely, if at all, covered."
CAQ did not come out with an AIDS article until six years
later, in their Fall 1996 (No. 58) issue. This article, "Tracking the Real
Genocide," by David Gilbert, a prison inmate, hardly fulfilled Schaap's
call for fair coverage of "alternative theories." Gilbert offers a two-sentence summary of
Segal's theory, failing to mention that Segal claims the virus escaped by
accident, thus making it appear that Segal blamed the Pentagon for spreading it
on purpose, which he did not. This gross misrepresentation of Segal is
especially surprising considering what Schaap had written to me six years
earlier (12/27/90):
We have real problems
with the Segal material, even though we did, at CAIB, publish Dr. Lehrman's
article which relied to some extent on it. (We do have his English monograph.)
There was a logical fallacy in Lehrman's reliance, too, because he used Segal's
theories to bolster his notion that the release of AIDS was deliberate, even
though Segal believes that it was accidentally released.
But in
1996, Schaap allows Gilbert to get away with this blatant misrepresentation.
What
"problems," one must ask, did the CAIB editors have with the Segal
material? Why did they have no problems with the Gilbert article, which they
must have known was a travesty? Gilbert not only misrepresents Segal but fails
completely to mention other dissident AIDS researchers, notably Robert Strecker
and Alan Cantwell. He dismisses the science of the matter by asking his microbiologist
friend Janet Stavnezer, who assured him that "the Segals' splice theory is
scientifically impossible."
In
the issue of CAQ following the Gilbert article (No. 59, Winter 1996), Nathaniel
Lehrman writes in a letter to the editor that his 1987 article "Is AIDS
Non-Infectious" (CAIB No. 28) "examined and demolished the Segal
hypothesis of a synthetically created AIDS virus." This is truly astonishing. It will be clear
to anyone who reads the earlier article that exactly the opposite is true. In
that article, Lehrman suggests that HIV, although it is only "closely
associated " with AIDS [following Duesberg], might be "a
laboratory-created, minimally infective agent intended to be blamed for the
chemical poisoning it actually accompanies."
Far from "demolishing" Segal, Lehrman affirms
and goes considerably beyond it,
suggesting that AIDS was not only man-made, but made on purpose:
The information
described here, and the history of CBW research, suggest that AIDS may indeed
be another example of a deliberately created disease (p. 62).
How is
one to understand such self-contradictions? Schaap tells me in 1990 that his
magazine wants to give decent coverage to "alternative" theories like
Segal's, and six years later he publishes an article that does just the
opposite. Gilbert gives us "official AIDS doctrine," as Lehrman puts
it, grossly misrepresenting Segal, and Lehrman responds with an even grosser
misrepresentation of what he himself had written in the same magazine nine
years earlier!
One thing is clear: the message, flawed as it is, from
CAIB/CAQ is that theories of the artificial origin of AIDS are not to be taken
seriously.
Chomsky
and Vietnam
Chomsky's argument is that
1. Vietnam policy did not
change after the assassination (until 1968, of course)
2. Only tactics changed, quite
coincidentally, at the same time as the assassination, in response to the
changed military situation.
3. The change in tactics was
first made by JFK, not LBJ.
The first argument is justified
by Chomsky's definition of the word policy to mean "withdrawal if
and only if victory is assured." This is his interpretation, from which he
refuses to budge an inch, of one sentence in the McNamara-Taylor
recommendations approved by NSAM 263:
This action [troop
withdrawals] should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term
program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of
the war effort.
Chomsky
insists that the last six words constitute an "explicit condition" of
victory before any withdrawal would take place, and that this was the policy of
both JFK and LBJ.
This
is pure linguistics. Now, Chomsky is the greatest linguist in the world, but
look at the linguistic facts he ignores in his interpretation:
First,
the sentence can easily be understood to mean "This is the way we should
explain it, but not necessarily the whole truth." Obviously, McNamara and
Taylor (and JFK) would not have wanted it to look like they were simply
abandoning the South Vietnamese.
More importantly, the phrase "without impairment of
the war effort" is not an
explicit condition, even if the most famous linguist in the world says it is.
Consider:
My plan is to wash the
windows without hurting the plants.
Does this mean (Chomsky's
interpretation)
My plan is to wash the
windows if and only if I can do so without hurting the plants.
or does it mean, as I am quite
certain it does,
My plan is to wash the
windows and not hurt the plants (and I think I can do so).
This is what the sentence
means, and it is what McNamara and Taylor meant:
The plan–at least the
way we should explain the plan–is to withdraw and do so without impairment of
the war effort (which as we have said should be taken over completely by the
Vietnamese by the end of 1965).
But
Chomsky wants us to understand it as: "The plan is to withdraw if and only
if victory is assured."
Who
is right? You be the judge.
The
second argument is meant to back up the first. If the policy never changed, it
does not matter when the tactics changed, whether under JFK or LBJ, but we
would still be left with the troublesome coincidence that the change in tactics
(in fact a reversal, from withdrawal to escalation, from not fighting the war
to fighting the war) took place immediately after the assassination.
But
lo and behold, on Jan. 31, 1991, right out of the blue, apparently, a draft of
NSAM 273 appears from the black box that houses "national security"
secrets, with no explanation as to why it was being released 13 years after the
final document was released (NSAM 273 was declassified in 1978), or who or what
was causing it to be released (an interesting question in itself, as is the
question of its authenticity).
This
is all Chomsky needs for his third argument: If anyone should insist that even
a reversal of tactics, if not of policy, so close on the heels of the murder of
the head of state in charge of both the policy and the tactics, could be
suspicious, thanks to the Bundy draft we now know that the person behind the
change in tactics was not Johnson, but Kennedy.
Why?
Because Bundy wrote the draft on Nov. 21, one day before the assassination!
Therefore, Chomsky concludes, JFK would have signed it (although he never saw
it or discussed it with Bundy or anyone else). Therefore, Chomsky further
concludes, the people who say NSAM 273 shows a change in policy (Peter Dale
Scott, John Newman, Arthur Schlesinger) are right, but wrong about who was
responsible for it.
Chomsky's
third argument actually contradicts the first. It's like saying, "I don't
care what flavor it is, but make sure it's vanilla." If
"tactical" changes don't matter, they don't matter. If they don't
matter, there is no reason to make the further point–dubious in itself–that JFK
made the change. By adding this third argument, Chomsky allows for the
possibility that the "tactical" change was indeed significant, which
destroys the premise expressed in the first argument.
What does all this mean? What is the message we are hearing from Chomsky
and CAIB/CAQ? It is clear:
No AIDS conspiracy
No assassination
conspiracy
No connection between
Vietnam and the assassination
Surely
it cannot escape our attention that this is precisely the same message we have
been hearing from the government, from the mainstream press, and the so-called
"scientific community." Nor should it escape our attention, as I
think even this brief summary shows, that the argumentation presented to
support these conclusions is patently false in each case.
Of
course it is not necessarily wrong to agree with the government. But when "radical
dissidents" agree so completely with the government, on such important
questions, and the reasoning employed is so clearly wrong, the warning bells
should sound.
Ding dong.